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Abstract
Recently, a new fast public key exchange protocol was presented by S. Bouftass. The protocol
is based on the difficulty of inverting the function F (x) = ⌊(zx mod 2p)/2q⌋. In this paper, we
describe a practical attack against this protocol based on Closest Vector Problem (CVP) and
Gaussian lattice reduction.
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1 Introduction
In public key cryptography, the security of traditional methods is based on number theoretic prob-
lems, and suffers from high computational cost due to problems such as dealing with large numbers.
Each user in a public key system has a pair of cryptographic keys, consisting a public key and a
private key. These are related through a hard mathematical inversion problem, so that the pri-
vate key cannot be feasibly derived from the public key. A standard implementation of public key
cryptography is based on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol[1]. This protocol allows two
users, Alice and Bob, to exchange a secret key over an insecure communication channel. It can be
described as following:
1. Alice and Bob openly agree upon a large prime p and g ∈ Z∗p.
2. Alice randomly chooses the secret integer a ∈ [1, p − 1].
3. Alice computes A = ga mod p, and publishes A.
4. Bob randomly chooses the secret integer b ∈ [1, p − 1],
5. Bob computes B = gb mod p, and publishes B.
6. Alice computes the secret integer KA = B
a mod p = gba mod p.
7. Bob computes the secret integer KB = A
b mod p = gab mod p.
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Then Alice and Bob can get the same shared secret key K = KA = KB . The eavesdropper Eve
knows p, g,A and B, and she needs to compute the secret key K. For this, it suffices to solve one
of the discrete logarithm problems:
A = ga mod p and B = gb mod p
for the unknowns a or b. If p is a very large prime of say 2048 bits, then the problem becomes
computationally hard, and it is considered infeasible. For maximum security p should be a safe
prime, i.e. (p− 1)/2 is also a prime, and g a primitive root of p [2].
Recently, to construct a cryptosystem which is not based on number theory, S.Bouftass described
a new public key exchange protocol relying on the difficulty of inverting the function F (x) =
⌊(zx mod 2p)/2q⌋ [3]. In our work, we find that this system is not secure, we can easily break this
system based on the closest vector problem ([4],[5]) and Gaussian lattice reduction[4]. This paper is
organized as follows, in section 2 we give a general description of S.Bouftass’s new protocol; section
3 gives our method to break this system and an example; The last section is conclusion.
2 S.Bouftass’s new public key exchange cryptosystem
Throughout, if n is an integer and s ∈ N, we use a mod n to denote the nonnegative reminder of
a divided by n. We will use the same notation as in [3] to exchange the secret key. Alice and Bob
should agree on some integers: l, m, p, q, r, z, where z is l bits long, p+ q = l+m, p > m+ q+ r,
and r > 128. The protocol is then described as follows,
1. Alice and Bob agree upon the integers l,m, p, q, r, z. Alice randomly selects a private m bit
positive integer x, and Bob selects a private m bit positive integer y.
2. Alice computes U =
⌊
(xz) mod 2p
2q
⌋
and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob computes V =
⌊
(yz) mod 2p
2q
⌋
and sends it to Alice.
4. Alice computes Wa =
⌊
(xV ) mod 2p−q
2r+m
⌋
.
5. Bob computes Wb =
⌊
(yU) mod 2p−q
2r+m
⌋
.
6. The shared secret key is K = Wa = Wb when r > 128.
3 Practical attack to this cryptosystem
Let l, m, p, q, r and z be fixed as above and let F (x) =
⌊
(xz) mod 2p
2q
⌋
= u, then we have
2qu+ y = xz mod 2p
for some integer y with 0 ≤ y < 2q, i.e.
xz ≡ 2qu+ y ( mod 2p). (1)
Hence, finding an element x ∈ F−1({u}) is equivalent to finding a proper vector
[
x
y
]
that satisfies
equation (1), and 0 ≤ y < 2q.
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Theorem 1. All solutions to equation (1) are of the form
[
x
y
]
=
[
x0 + α1x1 + α2x2
y0 + α1y1 + α2y2
]
, where
α1, α2 ∈ Z and
x0 =
⌈
2qu
z
⌉
, y0 = zx0 − 2
qu;
x1 =
⌊
2qu
z
⌋
, y1 = zx1 − 2
p;
x2 =
⌊
2qu
z
⌋
+ 1, y2 = zx2 − 2
p.
Proof. Let x0, y0, x1, y1 and x2, y2 be the values that are defined above, then it is obvious that for
all integers α1 and α2 we always have
(x0 + α1x1 + α2x2)z ≡ 2
qu+ (y0 + α1y1 + α2y2) ( mod 2
p),
i.e. all vectors of the form
[
x
y
]
=
[
x0 + α1x1 + α2x2
y0 + α1y1 + α2y2
]
are solutions to equation (1) for ∀α1, α2 ∈
Z.
On the other hand, since
x0z ≡ 2
qu+ y0 ( mod 2
p),
let
[
xˆ
yˆ
]
be an arbitrary solution to equation (1), then
(xˆ− x0)z ≡ yˆ − y0 ( mod 2
p).
Hence there exists n ∈ Z, such that
(xˆ− x0)z = n2
p + yˆ − y0, (2)
i.e.
xˆ− x0 =
n2p + yˆ − y0
z
= n
⌊
2p
z
⌋
+ C +
yˆ − y0
z
for some number C ∈ R.
Since xˆ− x0 is integer, C +
yˆ−y0
z
should also be an integer, call it N . Now we have
xˆ− x0 = n
⌊
2p
z
⌋
+N = (n−N)
⌊
2p
z
⌋
+N
(⌊
2p
z
⌋
+ 1
)
.
Let n−N = α1 and N = α2, we can get
xˆ− x0 = α1x1 + α2x2. (3)
Next, combining equations (2) and (3) we have
yˆ − y0 = (α1x1 + α2x2)z − n2
p
= α1(zx1 − 2
p) + α2(zx2 − 2
p)
= α1y1 + α2y2.
So
[
xˆ
yˆ
]
=
[
x0 + α1x1 + α2x2
y0 + α1y1 + α2y2
]
.
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1. Set u1 ←
[
x1
y1
]
,u2 ←
[
x2
y2
]
and done ← 0;
2. While done = 0, do
• c1 ← Round
(
〈u1,u2〉
〈u2,u2〉
)
; u1 ← u1 − c1u2;
• c2 ← Round
(
〈u1,u2〉
〈u1,u1〉
)
; u2 ← u2 − c2u1;
• if c1 = 0 and c2 = 0, then done← 1.
3. Solve the equation [u1,u2]
[
α1
α2
]
=
[
x0
y0
]
4. a1 ← ⌊α1⌋, a2 ← ⌊α2⌋;
5.
[
x
y
]
←
[
x0
y0
]
− a1u1 − a2u2
Note: In this algorithm, we let Round
(
±12
)
= 0.
Theorem 2. The following algorithm can be used to find a minimal solution
[
x
y
]
of equation (1),
with respect to the norm induced by an arbitrary inner product 〈−,−〉 on R2.
Proof. First we show that the algorithm terminates.
Without loss of generality, we can assume c1 = Round
(
〈u1,u2〉
〈u2,u2〉
)
6= 0, and let 〈u1,u2〉〈u2,u2〉 = c1 + ε,
where −12 ≤ ε ≤
1
2 . Then
‖ u1 − c1u2 ‖
2 =‖ u1 ‖
2 +c21 ‖ u2 ‖
2 −2c1〈u1,u2〉
=‖ u1 ‖
2 − ‖ u2 ‖
2
(
2c1
〈u1,u2〉
〈u2,u2〉
− c21
)
=‖ u1 ‖
2 − ‖ u2 ‖
2
(
2c1ε+ c
2
1
)
Case I: Suppose c1 > 0, then c1 ≥ 1. Since Round
(
1
2
)
= 0, we have either −12 < ε < 0 or ε ≥ 0.
Hence c1 + 2ε > 0, and 2c1ε+ c
2
1 > 0 as well.
Case II: Suppose c1 < 0, then c1 ≤ −1. SinceRound
(
−12
)
= 0, we have either 0 < ε < 12 or
ε ≤ 0. Now c1 + 2ε < 0, so 2c1ε+ c
2
1 > 0.
So by both of these two cases, we always have 2c1ε + c
2
1 > 0, i.e. ‖ u1 − c1u2 ‖
2<‖ u1 ‖
2.
By a similar argument we can get that ‖ u2 − c2u1 ‖
2<‖ u2 ‖
2. That means ‖u1‖ and ‖u2‖
are strictly decreasing. Since there are only finite number of elements in L with norm less than
max
{∥∥∥∥
[
x1
y1
]∥∥∥∥ ,
∥∥∥∥
[
x2
y2
]∥∥∥∥
}
, the algorithm must terminate.
Furthermore when c1 = c2 = 0, it’s trivial to see that
|〈u1,u2〉| ≤
1
2
min{|〈u1,u1〉| , |〈u2,u2〉|}.
Now we show that {u1,u2} is a basis of L. By the algorithm, it’s easy to see that u1 and u2
are linear combinations of
[
x1
y1
]
and
[
x2
y2
]
, so SpanZ(u1,u2) ⊆ L; on the other hand, every
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step of the algorithm is invertible, we also have L ⊆ SpanZ(u1,u2). Hence after terminating,
L = SpanZ(u1,u2).
Since u1, u2 are linearly independent over R, there exist α1, α2 in R, such that[
x0
y0
]
= α1u1 + α2u2.
Let a1, a2 ∈ N with a1 = Round(α1) and a2 = Round(α2), now we want to show that
∥∥∥∥
[
x0
y0
]
− a1u1 − a2u2
∥∥∥∥
is minimized. Let z = b1u1 + b2u2 be an arbitrary vector in L, and let
d =
∥∥∥∥
[
x0
y0
]
− z
∥∥∥∥
2
−
∥∥∥∥
[
x0
y0
]
− a1u1 − a2u2
∥∥∥∥
2
, (4)
we have the following cases:
Case 1: a1 = b1, a2 = b2, then d = 0.
Case 2: a1 6= b1, a2 = b2, then
d = ‖(α1 − b1)u1 + (α2 − b2)u2‖
2 − ‖(α1 − a1)u1 + (α2 − a2)u2‖
2
= (α1 − b1)
2 ‖u1‖
2 + (α2 − b2)
2 ‖u2‖
2 + 2(α1 − b1)(α2 − b2)〈u1,u2〉
−(α1 − a1)
2 ‖u1‖
2 − (α2 − a2)
2 ‖u2‖
2 − 2(α1 − a1)(α2 − a2)〈u1,u2〉
= (α1 − b1 + α1 − a1) (a1 − b1) ‖u1‖
2 + 2 (a1 − b1) (α2 − a2) 〈u1,u2〉
≥ 2 (α1 − b1 + α1 − a1) (a1 − b1) |〈u1,u2〉|+ 2 (a1 − b1) (α2 − a2) 〈u1,u2〉.
If a1 > b1, we have a1 − b1 > 0, 2α1 − a1 − b1 ≥ 1 ≥| α2 − a2 |, i.e. d ≥ 0; if a1 < b1, then
a1 − b1 < 0, 2α1 − a1 − b1 ≤ −1, but | 2α1 − a1 − b1 |≥| α2 − a2 |, we still have d ≥ 0.
Case 3: a1 = b1, a2 6= b2, this is the same as Case 2.
Case 4: a1 6= b1, a2 6= b2, then
d = ‖(α1 − b1)u1 + (α2 − b2)u2‖
2 − ‖(α1 − b1)u1 + (α2 − a2)u2‖
2
+ ‖(α1 − b1)u1 + (α2 − a2)u2‖
2 − ‖(α1 − a1)u1 + (α2 − a2)u2‖
2
≥ 0.
The inequality is because of Case 2 and 3.
Above all, the norm of the vector
[
x0
y0
]
− a1u1 − a2u2 is minimized.
Since the vectors
[
x1
y1
]
and
[
x2
y2
]
are two solutions to the equation zx ≡ y( mod 2p), all linear
combinations of these two vectors are also solutions to this equation, in particular, a1u1+a2u2 is a
solution; on the other hand
[
x0
y0
]
satisfies the equation xz ≡ 2qu+ y( mod 2p). Hence the vector[
x0
y0
]
− a1u1 − a2u2 is a solution to the equation xz ≡ 2
qu + y( mod 2p), and it is minimal by
previous result.
So, by all of the above arguments we can see that the algorithm can be used to find the minimal
solution of equation (1).
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But only find the minimal solution of equation (1) is still not enough to break the cryptosystem,
because according to the system the solution should also satisfy

0 ≤ x < 2m
0 ≤ 2qu+ y < 2m
0 ≤ y < 2q,
or, equivalently {
0 ≤ x < 2m =: B1
0 ≤ y < min{2q, 2m − 2qu} =: B2.
To fix our algorithm, we define an inner product on R2 by
〈[
a1
b1
]
,
[
a2
b2
]〉
= a1a2 +
(
B1
B2
)2
b1b2.
It is easy to see that even with this new inner product, the proof in theorem 2 is still true. Let
{u1,u2} be the minimal basis that we have found in the algorithm, and also let v = (x0, y0)
T . Then
we can write all four corners of the rectangle which is bounded by v, v− (B1, 0)
T , v− (0, B2)
T and
v− (B1, B2)
T as real linear combinations of u1, u2, and then use this to find a lattice point within
the bounding region (See the figure). By assumption, we know that there is at least one such lattice
point; there could be more than one, but any one will solve the problem at hand.
B2
v
B1
u1
u2
An example based on our algorithm is as follows,
Example 1. Alice chooses her secret key X = 12345, which is 14-bit long, Bob and she agree on
some common integers Z = 6173, q = 5 and p = 22, then by Bouftass’s protocol, Alice needs to send
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the number
U =
⌊
(XZ)mod(2p)
2q
⌋
= 708192
to Bob.
To recover Alice’s secret key X, Eve can use the above algorithm to get:
x0 = 115, y0 = 1703, u1 =
[
−25140
28
]
and u2 =
[
−33973
−129
]
.
By computing the four corners, v = 13.790u1 − 10.208u2, v − (B1, 0)
T = 14.252u1 − 10.108u2,
v − (0, B2)
T = 13.531u1 − 10.016u2 and v − (B1, B2)
T = 13.992u1 − 9.916u2, Eve will find that[
x
y
]
=
[
115
1703
]
− 14
[
−25140
28
]
+ 10
[
−33973
−129
]
=
[
12345
21
]
,
i.e. x = 12345 and y = 21.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a practical attack to Bouftass’s cryptosystem based on Gaussian lattice
reduction. Our attack is simple and fast, it works when the conditions l + m = p + q and p >
m + q are satisfied. We proved that our algorithm can definitely find a solution to the equation
u =
⌊
(xz)mod(2p)
2q
⌋
, but the solution is not necessarily unique.
We also remark that a similar approach using LLL algorithm seems to work in practice, but the
method presented here admitted an easier proof.
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